O LAPA teve história curta. Melhor seria dizer que ele foi a pré-história do LaSPA, o Laboratório de Sociologia dos Processos de Associação, sediado no IFCH-UNICAMP. Todo o conteúdo deste blog foi transferido para o blog do novo laboratório. Este blog não será mais atualizado.


:: Gilbert Simondon Entretien sur la mécanologie (1968)

:: As coisas (Antunes 2006 [1992])

ANTUNES, Arnaldo. 2006. Como é que chama o nome disso: Antologia. São Paulo: Publifolha.

As coisas têm peso, massa, volume, tamanho, tempo, forma, cor, posição, textura, duração, densidade, cheiro, valor, consistência, profundidade, contorno, temperatura, função, aparência, preço, destino, idade, sentido. As coisas não têm paz. (p.111)

:: The concept of Nature (Whitehead 1971 [1919])

WHITEHEAD, Alfred N. 1971. The concept of Nature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [1919]


These two facts, namely the passage of events and the extension of events over each other, are in my opinion the qualities from which time and space originate as abstractions. (Whitehead 1971:34)


Simultaneity is the property of a group of natural elements which in some sense are components of a duration. A duration can be all nature present as the immediate fact posited by sense-awareness. A duration retains within itself the passage of nature. There are within it antecedents and consequents which are also durations which may be the complete specious presents of quicker consciousness. In other words a duration retains temporal thickness. Any concept of all nature as immediately known is always a concept of some duration though it may be enlarged in its temporal thickness beyond the possible specious present of any being known to us as existing within nature. Thus simultaneity is an ultimate factor in nature, immediate for sense-awareness. (Whitehead 1971:56)


What we perceive as present is the vivid fringe of memory tinged with anticipation. (Whitehead 1971:73)

O EVENTO (unidade de análise):

We perceive one unit factor in nature; and this factor is that something is going on then-there. […] It is this unit factor, retaining in itself the passage of nature, which is the primary concrete element discriminated in nature. These primary factors are what I mean by events. (Whitehead 1971:75)

Wherever and whenever something is going on, there is an event. (Whitehead 1971:78)


I will therefore use the name ‘event-particles’ for the ideal minimum limits to events. (Whitehead 1971:86)

[C]onsider a point of the instantaneous space which we conceive as apparent to us in an almost instantaneous glance. This point is an event-particle. (Whitehead 1971:89)


The peculiar simplicity of an instantaneous point has a twofold origin, one connected with position, that is to say with its character as a punct, and the other connected with its character as an event-particle. The simplicity of the punct arises from its indivisibility by a moment. […] The simplicity of an event-particle arises from the indivisibility of its intrinsic character. The intrinsic character of an event-particle is indivisible in the sense that every abstractive set covered by it exhibits the same intrinsic character. […] These two characters of simplicity enjoyed […] by event-particles and puncts define a meaning for Euclid´s phrase, ‘without parts and without magnitude.’ (Whitehead 1971:94)

SIMPLICIDADE e o EVENTO-PARTÍCULA (abstração epistemológica):

[W]hen we seek definitely to express the relations of events which arise from their spatio-temporal structure, we approximate to simplicity by progressibely diminishing the extent (both temporal and spatial) of the events considered. […] Thus we finally reach the ideal of an event so restricted in its extension as to be without extension in space or extension in time. Such an event is a mere spatial point-flash of instantaneous duration. I call such an ideal event an ‘event-particle’. […] [E]vent-particles are abstractions in their relations to the more concrete events. But then by this time you will have comprehended that you cannot analyse concrete nature without abstracting. (Whitehead 1971:172-3)



The totality of event-particles will form a four-dimensional manifold, the extra dimension arising from time – in other words – arising from the points of a timeless space being each a class of event-particles. (Whitehead 1971:86)

SIMPLICIDADE (o alvo traiçoeiro do filósofo natural):

The guiding motto in the life of every natural philosopher should be, Seek simplicity and distrust it. (Whitehead 1971:163)


There is a general agreement that Einstein’s investigations have one fundamental merit irrespective of any criticisms which we may feel inclined to pass on them. They have made us think. (Whitehead 1971:164)


In natural science ‘to explain’ means merely to discover ‘interconnexions’. (Whitehead 1971:97)


Whatever passes is an event. But we find entities in nature which do not pass; namely we recognise samenesses in nature. (Whitehead 1971:124)

In perception we recognise. […] Recognition is not primarily an intellectual act of comparison; it is in its essence merely sense-awareness in its capacity of positing before us factors in nature which do not pass. […] Factors in nature which are without passage will be called objects. (Whitehead 1971:124-5)

Recognition is reflected into the intellect as comparison. The recognised objects of one event are compared with the recognised objects of another event. The comparison may be between two events in the present, or it may be between two events of which one is posited by memory-awareness and the other by immediate sense-awareness. But it is not the events which are compared. For each event is essentially unique and incomparable. What are compared are the objects and relations of objects situated in events. (Whitehead 1971:125)

The event considered as a relation between objects has lost its passage and in this aspect is itself an object. This object is not the event but only an intellectual abstraction. The same object can be situated in many events; and in this sense even the whole event, viewed as an object, can recur, though not the very event itself with its passage and its relations to other events. (Whitehead 1971:125)

Objects are elements in nature which do not pass. The awareness of an object as some factor not sharing in the passage of nature is what I call ‘recognition’. It is impossible to recognise an event, because an event is essentially distinct from every other event. Recognition is an awareness of sameness. […] I use recognition for the non-intellectual relation of sense-awareness which connects the mind with a factor of nature without passage. On the intellectual side of the mind’s experience there are comparisons of things recognised and consequent judgments of sameness or diversity. […] I am quite willing to believe that recognition, in my sense of the term, is merely an ideal limit, and that there is in fact no recognition without intellectual accompaniments of comparison and judgment. But recognition is that relation of the mind to nature which provides the material for the intellectual activity. (Whitehead 1971:143)

An object is an ingredient in the character of some event. In fact the character of an event is nothing but the objects which are ingredient in it and the ways in which those objects make their ingression into the event. Thus the theory of objects is the theory of the comparison of events. Events are only comparable because they body forth permanences. We are comparing objects in events whenever we can say. ‘There it is again.’ Objects are the elements in nature which can ‘be again.’ (Whitehead 1971:143-4)

The ingression of an object into an event is the way the character of the event shapes itself in virtue of the being of the object. Namely the event is what it is, because the object is what it is; and when I am thinking of this modification of the event by the object, I call the relation between the two ‘the ingression of the object into the event.’ It is equally true to say that objects are what they are because events are what they are. Nature is such that there can be no events and no objects without the ingression of objects into events. (Whitehead 1971:144)

You cannot recognise an event; because when it is gone, it is gone. You may observe another event of analogous character, but the actual chunk of the life of nature is inseparable from its unique occurrence. But a character of an event can be recognised. […] Things which we thus recognise I call objects. An object is situated in those events or in that stream of events of which it expresses the character. (Whitehead 1971:169)


King Alfred the Great was ignorant of the laws of motion, but knew very well what he meant by the measurement of time, and achieved his purpose by means of burning candles. […] Uniformity in change is directly perceived, and it follows that mankind perceives in nature factors from which a theory of temporal congruence can be formed. (Whitehead 1971:137)


These three types [sense-objects, perceptual objects and scientific objects] form an ascending hierarchy, of which each member presupposes the type below. (Whitehead 1971:149)

The base of the hierarchy is formed by the sense-objects. These objects do not presuppose any other type of objects. A sense-object is a factor of nature posited by sense-awareness which (i), in that it is an object, does not share in the passage of nature and (ii) is not a relation between other factors of nature. It will of course be a relatum in relations which also implicate other factors of nature. But it is always a relatum and never the relation itself. Examples of sense-objects are a particular sort of colour, say Cambridge blue, or a particular sort of sound, or a particular sort of smell, or a particular sort of feeling. (Whitehead 1971:149)

When we look at a coat, we do not in general say, There is a patch of Cambridge blue; what naturally occurs to us is, There is a coat. […] What we perceive is an object other than a mere sense-object. It is not a mere patch of colour, but something more; and it is that something more which we judge to be a coat. […] The coat which is perceived – in the sense of the word ‘coat’ – is what I call a perceptual object. […] The perceptual object is not primarily the issue of a judgment. It is a factor of nature directly posited in sense-awareness. The element of judgment comes in when we proceed to classify the partticular perceptual object. […] The perceptual object is the outcome of the habit of experience. A sense-objetc [perceptual object?] is not the porduct of the association of intellectual ideas; it is the product of the association of sense-objects in the same situation. (Whitehead 1971:153-5)

A scientific object such as a definite electron is a systematic correlation of the characters of all events throughout all nature. It is an aspect of the systematic character of nature. The electron is not merely where its charge is. The charge is que quantitative character of certain events due to the ingression of the electron into nature. The electron is its whole field of force. Namely the electron is the systematic way in which all events are modified as the expression of its ingression. (Whitehead 1971:158-9)


[I]n science we have found out that when we know all about the adventures amid events of material physical objects and of scientific objects we have most of the relevant information which will enable us to predict the conditions under which we shall perceive sense-objects in specific situations. […] [T]hus, to a large extent, the appearance of sense-objects is conditioned by the adventures of material objects. The analysis of these adventures makes us aware of another character of events, namely their characters as fields of activity which determine the subsequent events to which they will pass on the objects situated in them. We express these fields of activity in terms of gravitational, electromagnetic, or chemical forces and attractions. (Whitehead 1971:170)


It is not every object which can be located in a moment. An object which can be located in every moment of some duration will be called a ‘uniform’ object throughout that duration. Ordinary physical objects appear to us to be uniform objects, and we habitually assume that scientific objets such as electrons are uniform. But some sense-objects certainly are not uniform. A tune is an example of a non-uniform object. We have perceived it as a whole in a certain duration; but the tune as a tune is not at any moment of that duration though one of the individual notes may be located there. (Whitehead 1971:162)

A ESPECIFICAÇÃO DE UM EVENTO (momento, local e caráter):

In order to specify an observed event, the place, the time, and character of the event are necessary. (Whitehead 1971:165)


Nature is known to us in our experience as a complex of passing events. In this complex we discern definite mutual relations between component events, which we may call their relative positions, and these positions we express partly in terms of space and partly in terms of time. Also in addition to its mere relative position to other events, each particular event has its own peculiar character. In other words, nature is a structure of events and each event has its position in this structure and its own peculiar character or quality. (Whitehead 1971:166)

[T]he concrete facts of nature are events exhibiting a certain structure in their mutual relations and certain characters of their own. The aim of science is to express the relations between their characters in terms of the mutual structural relations between the events thus characterised. The mutual structural relations between events are both spatial and temporal. (Whitehead 1971:167-8)


By saying that space and time are abstractions, I do not meand that they do not express for us real facts about nature. What I mean is that there are no spatial facts or temporal facts apart from physical nature, namely that space and time are merely ways of expressing certain truths about the relations between events. (Whitehead 1971:168)


:: What is life? (Schrödinger 1992 [1944])

SCHRÖDINGER, Erwin. 1993. What is life? The physical aspect of the living cell, with Mind and matter & Autobiographical sketches. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [1944]


Now, why are atoms so small? Clearly, the question is an evasion. For it is not really aimed at the size of the atoms. It is concerned with the size of organisms, more particularly with the size of our own corporeal selves. Indeed, the atom is small, when referred to our civic unit of lenght, say the yard or the metre. […] The king would naturally indicate a length comparable with that of his own body, knowing that anything else would be very inconvenient. […] It thus being settled that our question really aims at the ratio of two lengths – that of our body and that of the atom – with an incontestable priority of independent existence on the side of the atom, the question truly reads: Why must our bodies be so large compared with the atom? […] I can imagine that many a keen student of physics or chemistry may have deplored the fact that every one of our sense organs, forming a more or less substantial part of our body and hence (in view of the magnitude of the said ratio) being itself composed of innumerable atoms, is much too coarse to be affected by the impact of a single atom. We cannot see or feel or hear the single atoms. Our hypotheses with regard to them differ widely from the immediate findings of our gross sense organs and cannot be put to the test of direct inspection. (Schrödinger 1992:7-8)


A small molecule might be called ‘the germ of a solid’. Starting from such a small solid germ, there seem to be twoo different eways of building up larger and larger associations. One is the comparatively dull way of repeating the same structure in three directions again and again. That is the way followed in a growing crystal. Once the periodicity is established, there is no definite limit to the size of the aggregate. The other way is that of building up a more and more extended aggregate without the dull device of repetition. That is the case of the more and more complicated organic molecule in which every atom, and every group of atoms, plays an individual role, not entirely equivalent to that of many others (as is the case in a periodic structure). We might quite properly call that an aperiodic crystal or solid and express our hypothesis by saying: We believe a gene – or perhaps the whole chromosome fibre – to be an aperiodic solid. (Schrödinger 1992:60-1)


What I wish to make clear in this last chapter is, in short, that from all we have learnt about the structure of living matter, we must be prepared to find it working in a manner that cannot be reduced to the ordinary laws of physics. And that not on the ground that there is any ‘new force’ or what not, directing the behaviour of the single atoms within a living organism, but because the construction is different from anything we have yet tested in the physical laboratory. To put it crudely, an engineer, familiar with heat engines only, will, after inspecting the construction of an electric motor, be prepared to find it working along principles which he does not yet understand. He finds the copper familiar to him in kettles used here in the form of long, long wires wound in coils; the iron familiar to him in levers and bars and steam sylinders is here filling the interior of those coils of copper wire. He will be convinced that it is the same copper and the same iron, subject to the same laws of Nature, and he is right in that. The difference in construction is enough to prepare him for an entirely different way of functioning. He will not suspect that an electric motor is driven by a ghost because it is set spinning by the turn of a switch, without boiler and steam. (Schrödinger 1992:76)

O PROBLEMA DA ORDEM (fisico-bio-social)

An organism’s astonishing gift of concentrating a ‘stream of order’ on itself and thus escaping the decay into atomic chaos – of ‘drinking orderliness’ from a suitable environment – seems to be connected with the presence of the ‘aperiodic solids’, the chromosome molecules, which doubtless represent the highest degree of well-ordered atomic association we know of – much higher than the ordinary periodic crystal – in virtue of the individual role every atom and every radical is playing here. […] To put it briefly, we witness the event that existing order displays the power of maintaining itself and of producing orderly events. That sounds plausible enough, though in finding it plausible we, no doubt, draw on experience concerning social organization and other events which involve the activity of organisms. And so it might seem that someting like a vicious circle is implied. (Schrödinger 1992:77)

O MOLAR (estatística), O MOLECULAR (mecânica) e A INFOPOLÍTICA (cibernética):

[In biology] A single group of atoms existing only in one copy produces orderly events, marvellously tuned in with each other and with the environment according to most subtle laws. […] Since we know the power this tiny central office has in the isolated cell, do they not resemble stations of local government dispersed through the body, communicating with each other with great ease, thanks to the code that is common to all of them? […] [W]e are here obviously faced with events whose regular and lawful unfolding is guided by a ‘mechanism’ entirely different from the ‘probability mechanism’ of physics. For it is simply a fact of observation that the guiding principle in every cell is embodied in a single atomic association existing only in one copy (or sometimes two [in diploids]) – and a fact of observation that it results in producing events which are a paragon of orderlliness. […] [T]he situation is unprecedented, it is unknown anywhere else except in living matter. (Schrödinger 1992:79)


It appears that there are two different ‘mechanisms’ by which orderly events can be produced: the ‘statistical mechanism’ which produces ‘order from disorder’ and the new one, producing ‘order from order’. […] In short, all purely mechanical events seem to follow distinctly and directly the ‘order-from-order’ principle. (Schrödinger 1992:80-1)

ORDEM COMO EFEITO TERMODINÂMICO (Teorema de Nernst e mecânica quântica):

When does a physical system – any kind of association of atoms – display ‘dynamical law’ (in Plank’s meaning) or ‘clock-work features’? Quantum theory has a very short answer to this question, viz. at the absolute zero of temperature. As zero temperature is approached the molecular disorder ceases to have any bearing on physical events. […] Quantum theory provides the rational foundation of Nernst’s empriical law, and also enables us to estimate how closely a system must approach to the absolute zero in order to display an approximately ‘dynamical’ behaviour. What temperature is in any particular case already practically equivalent to zero? […] Now you must not believe that this always has to be a very low temperature.(Schrödinger 1992:84)


But please do not accuse me of calling the chromosome fibres just the ‘cogs of the organic machine’ – at least not without a reference to the profound physical theories on which the simile is based. […] For, indeed, it needs still less rhetoric to recall the fundamental difference between the two and to justify the epithets novel and unprecedented in the biological case. […] The most striking features are: first, the curious distribution of the cogs in a many-celled organism, for which I may refer to the somewhat poetical description on p.79; and secondly, the fact that the single cog is not of coarse human make, but is the finest masterpiece ever achieved along the lines of the Lord’s quantum mechanics. (Schrödinger 1992:85)


(i) My body functions as a pure mechanism according to the Laws of Nature. […] (ii) Yet I know, by incontrovertible direct experience, that I am directing its motions, of which I forsee the effects, that may be fateful and all-important, in which case I feel and take full responsibility for them. (Schrödinger 1992:86-7)


Behaviour and physique merge into one. You simply cannot possess clever hands without using them for obtaining your aims, they would be in your way […]. You cannot have efficient wings without attempting to fly. You cannot have a modulated organ of speech without trying to imitate the noises you hear around you. To distinguish between the possession of an organ and the urge to use it and to increase its skill by practice, to regqard them as two different characteristics of the organism in question, would be an artificial distinction, made possible by an abstract language but having no counterpart in nature. We must, of course, not think that ‘behaviour’ after all gradually intrudes into the chromosome structure (or what not) and acquires ‘loci’ there. It is the new organs themselves (and they do become genetically fixed) that carry along with them the habit and the way of using them. Selection would be powerless in ‘producing’ a new organs if selection were not aided all along by the organism’s making appropriate use of it. And this is very essential. For thus, the two things go quite parallel and are ultimately, or indeed at every stage, fixed genetically as one thing: a used organ – as if Lamarck were right (Schrödinger 1992:113)


Instead of letting the ingenious machinery we have invented produce an increasing amount of superfluous luxury, we must plan to develop it so that it takes off human beings all the unintelligent, mechanical, ‘machine-like’ handling. The machine must take over the toil for which man is too good, not man the work for which the machine is too expensive, as comes to pass quite often. (Schrödinger 1992:116)

:: Uso de drogas: a alter-ação como evento (Vargas 2006)

VARGAS, Eduardo V. 2006. Uso de drogas: a alter-ação como evento. Revista de Antropologia 49(2):581-623.

A primeira seção do texto – Consenso moral e práticas recalcitrantes – abre com uma constatação: as políticas oficiais anti-drogas partem de (1) uma distinção arbitrária entre as drogas ilícitas (chamadas de “drogas”) e as drogas lícitas (chamadas de “fármacos” ou mesmo de “alimentos”) e de (2) um “consenso moral” segundo o qual “drogas causam dependência, fazem mal, quando não matam pura e simplesmente; usá-las, portanto, é um absurdo; logo, ‘diga não às drogas’.” (Vargas 2006:582)

Vargas então faz uma apresentação geral do desenvolvimento do texto, deixando claro que “recusar o consenso moral não significa fazer apologia às drogas, mas alimentar a controvérsia em busca de alternativas conseqüentes que levem em conta a afirmação eticamente sustentada da pluralidade imanente dos modos de existência”. Vale citar a expressão da proposta do texto, assim como de sua hipótese:

Proponho que, em vez de indagar o porquê ou qual o significado do uso de drogas, cabe perguntar o que ocorre ou que experiência os usuários atualizam mediante o consumo, questões que exigem outro modo de problematização do uso de drogas. Minha hipótese de trabalho é que o que ocorre são eventos (refiro-me àquilo que os usuários costumam chamar de ‘barato’, ‘viagem’ ou ‘onda’ das drogas) e que esses eventos implicam experimentações intensivas e autoabandono, ou o paradoxo de ações que deliberadamente visam ‘sair de si’. (Vargas 2006:583)

A segunda seção do texto – Para perguntas equívocas, só o erro é resposta – é uma espécie de contra-argumentação a esse “consenso moral”, baseada não na crítica, mas sim na reconfiguração da questão para a qual ele é a resposta dominante. Em síntese, a pergunta normalmente colocada ao uso de drogas é: se drogas fazem mal, por que as pessoas insistem em usá-las? Para este tipo de “pergunta equívoca”, muitos “erros” surgem como “resposta”:

o porquê ou o significado do uso de drogas são regularmente imputados a uma falta ou fraqueza, física e/ou moral, psíquica e/ou cultural, política e/ou social. Dito de um modo mais prosaico, habituamo-nos a pensar que o consumo de drogas seria uma resposta a uma crise ou a uma carência qualquer: consomem-se drogas porque faltam saúde, afeto, cultura, religião, escola, informação, dinheiro, família, trabalho, razão, consciência, liberdade etc. (Vargas 2006:58)

as questões do “por que” ou do “significado” dos usos não medicamentosos de drogas não são as únicas que podem ser postas, nem, creio, as mais relevantes[…] [. E]las não são as mesmas colocadas pelos próprios usuários que, habitualmente, se mostram pouco interessados em saber por que usam drogas ou qual o significado dessas práticas, salvo quando os analistas ou outras autoridades os indagam. [E]las condicionam de antemão o gênero de respostas que nos habituamos a considerar, já que, […] às perguntas suscitadas pela consideração das práticas de uso de drogas como disparatadas, as respostas aventadas (que procedem, via de regra, por redução de absurdo) só são capazes de apresentar soluções se concluem pelo erro, pela falta, pela fraqueza ou por algum outro de seus vizinhos semânticos. (Vargas 2006:587-8)

Num assim chamado “recenseamento […] sumário”, Vargas indica como isso ocorre em documentos da ONU, na neurobiologia, e entre profissionais das psi, sociólogos, cientistas sociais, e teóricos marxistas e mertonianos, citando Ross e Gilman, Chast, Masur e Carlini, Olievenstein, Freud, Le Breton, Becker, Caballero e Zaluar.

Na terceira seção do texto – Outras questões, outro modo de problematização -, Vargas cita Caiafa, Guattari, Gomart e Hennion, Dagognet e Pignarre, Tarde, Latour e Garfinkel para deslocar a questão que traz consigo o referido “consenso moral”. De especial interesse é a maneira como ele vincula sua proposta à concepção tardeana de “lógica social”:

[C]onsidero bem mais proveitoso tratar do assunto em termos de lógica social, desde que isso seja feito conforme a acepção emprestada a essa expressão por Gabriel Tarde, que a concebe como “a arte de mudar de pensamentos conservando sempre, sem aumento nem diminuição, a distância que nos separa do verdadeiro ou do falso” (Tarde, 1895b, p. 119). Assim considerada, a lógica social não diz respeito à busca ou à revelação da verdade, mas à direção dos agenciamentos (ou das ondas de crenças e de desejos, dizia Tarde) que animam o campo social. (Vargas 2006:589)

Ainda nesta seção, Vargas dedica uma importante nota de rodapé (nota 15) à sua concepção de “dispositivo das drogas“.

A quarta seção do texto – O evento ‘onda’ e a fórmula do êxtase -, Vargas deixa claro quais são as questões que efetivamente interessam aos usuários de drogas:

‘Bateu?’, ‘rolou?’, ‘fez?’ são questões que os usuários se colocam e que visam à ocorrência de acontecimentos singulares: o ‘barato’, a ‘viagem’, a ‘onda’ da droga. Mas o que é o ‘barato’, a ‘onda’, a ‘viagem’? É difícil dizer, é difícil expressar, é difícil representar, pois são eventos que ‘rolam’, que se desenrolam com a experiência, que acontecem mediante experimentação. Assim, quando solicitados a falar a respeito, os usuários costumam narrar experiências vividas em que ‘rolou’ o ‘barato’, a ‘viagem’, a ‘onda’: foi em tal lugar, em tal período do dia, estava com tais ‘chegados’, aí ‘pintou’ uma ‘presença’ e a droga foi consumida, aí eu fiquei (ou tudo ficou) ‘alterado’. É difícil extrair mais do que isso, pois não há mais o que dizer além do que passa, do que se passa. (Vargas 2006:591)

Evocando Latour, Whitehead e Gomart e Hennion, Vargas define “evento” como um “acontecimento” que “prolonga ações iniciadas em outros lugares, [e] ao mesmo tempo […] as transforma de modo surpreendente” (p. 592). Acompanhar um evento (como, por exemplo, um pesquisador deveria fazer) é “seguir os movimentos que nos fazem fazer algo que nos surpreende” (p.591). Citando um informante, Vargas evidencia que a “surpresa” implicada no evento é de ordem intensiva, “já que ‘a vida só vale a pena se for vivida intensamente’, como se ouve entre usuários” (p.592).

Por fim, Vargas chama a atenção para o seguinte paradoxo: “essas alterações intensivas que implicam abandono ou dissolução do eu são auto-engendradas, são voluntariamente visadas, são minuciosamente preparadas” (p.593). A “dissolução do eu” é, neste caso, um ato deliberado do “eu”.

Dessa perspectiva é possível sintetizar nos seguintes termos o paradoxo do êxtase ou do evento ‘onda’ das drogas, quando este chega a ser produzido enquanto tal: fazer de tudo (ou quase…) para que aconteça algo que nos escapa desde o início… (Vargas 2006:593)

A quinta seção do texto – Drogas e medicamentos – trata basicamente das complexidades envolvidas em qualquer tentativa de distinção entre “drogas” e “medicamentos”. Vargas evoca Akrich e Pignarre para demonstrar como as práticas envolvidas na produção e no consumo de “medicamentos” são da mesma natureza daquelas elvolvidas na produção e no consumo de “drogas”. Vargas indica ainda algumas distinções relevantes (entre amigos no caso das drogas ilícitas, entre familiares no caso das drogas lícitas e entre médicos e pacientes no caso dos remédios) entre os diferentes usos (medicamentosos ou não) das drogas. A seção se encerra com um “ponto capital”, apresentado a partir de Deleuze e Guattari: “sucede às drogas e aos medicamentos o mesmo que às armas e às ferramentas” (p.597).

“Ferramentas de trabalho e armas de guerra trocam suas determinações”, como drogas e medicamentos também o fazem. “Isso não impede que se possam reconhecer diferenças interiores, embora não intrínsecas (lógicas ou conceituais), ainda que por aproximação”, entre todas essas coisas, mas o ponto a ser destacado é que, tal como não é a ferramenta que define o trabalho, mas sim o inverso, não é a droga que define o crime, nem é o remédio que define a medicina: a droga supõe o crime, como o remédio supõe a medicina, e a ferramenta supõe o trabalho”. De um lado, isso significa que, como as armas e as ferramentas, as drogas e os medicamentos estão “submetidos às mesmas leis que definem precisamente a esfera comum”; de outro, isso significa também que qualquer objeto técnico (arma, ferramenta, droga, remédio ou alimento) “continua abstrato, inteiramente indeterminado, enquanto não for reportado a um agenciamento” que o constitua enquanto tal (ibid.).(Vargas 2006:597)

A sexta seção do texto – A ‘onda’ das drogas e o paradoxo da paixão

[to be continued…]

:: O atual e o virtual (Deleuze 1996)

DELEUZE, Gilles. 1996. O atual e o virtual. In: Éric Alliez. Deleuze Filosofia Virtual. (trad. Heloísa B.S. Rocha) São Paulo: Ed.34, pp.47-57.

Deleuze começa a primeira seção apresentando a Filosofia como “a teoria das multiplicidades”. Logo em seguida precisa que “[t]oda multiplicidade implica elementos atuais e elementos virtuais” (p.49). Ele então começa a tratar das relações entre tais elementos, primeiro colocando uma “partícula” no lugar do atual (com suas imagens virtuais) e em seguida colocando as “percepções” no mesmo lugar (mas dessa vez com as lembranças no lugar do virtual). Por fim, é na relação necessária do atual com o virtual que Deleuze vai localizar o plano de imanência:

O plano de imanência compreende a um só tempo o virtual e sua atualização, sem que possa haver aí limite assimilável entre os dois. O atual é o complemento ou o produto, o objeto da atualização, mas esta não tem por sujeito senão o virtual. A atualização pertence ao virtual. A atualização do virtual é a singularidade, ao passo que o próprio atual é a individualidade constituída. O atual cai para fora do plano como fruto, ao passo que a atualização o reporta ao plano como àquilo que reconverte o objeto em sujeito. (Deleuze 1996:51)

Deleuze abre a segunda seção do texto lembrando que o movimento de desdobramento de virtualidades a partir do atual coexiste com outro movimento de aproximação do atual de seu virtual. A teoria bergsoniana das lembranças é evocada (assim como A Dama de Xangai) para tratar da crescente indiscernibilidade (ou alternância) entre o atual e o virtual neste segundo movimento, que culmina com a imagem do cristal.

Essa troca perpétua entre o virtual e o atual define um cristal. (Deleuze 1996:54)

Deleuze então distingue a singularização/atualização (definida pela propagação de virtuais a partir de um atual) da individuação/cristalização (definida pela alternância entre um atual e o seu virtual).

A pura virtualidade não tem mais que se atualizar, uma vez que é estritamente correlativa ao atual com o qual forma o menor circuito. (Deleuze 1996:54)

Deleuze prossegue então para demonstrar como a mesma relação entre o atual e o virtual nas variantes singularização/atualização e individuação/cristalização opera na compreensão do “Tempo”:

Os dois aspectos do tempo, a imagem atual do presente que passa e a imagem virtual do passado que se conserva, distinguem-se na atualização, tendo simultaneamente um limite inassinalável, mas intercambiam-se na cristalização até se tornarem indiscerníveis, cada um apropriando-se do papel do outro. (Deleuze 1996:55)

E sintetiza o argumento desenvolvido até aqui:

A relação do atual com o virtual constitui sempre um circuito, mas de duas maneiras: ora o atual remete a virtuais como a outras coisas em vastos circuitos, onde o virtual se atualiza, ora o atual remete ao virtual como a seu próprio virtual, nos menores circuitos onde o virtual cristaliza com o atual. O plano de imanência contém a um só tempo a atualização como relação do virtual com outros termos, e mesmo o atual como termo com o qual o virtual se intercambia. (Deleuze 1996:55-6)

As últimas frases desta seção (e do texto) explicitam a importante distinção entre uma relação entre atuais e uma relação do atual com o virtual.

Em todos os casos, a relação do atual com o virtual não é a que se pode estabelecer entre dois atuais. Os atuais implicam indivíduos já constituídos, e determinações por pontos ordinários; ao passo que a relação entre o atual e o virtual forma uma individuação em ato ou uma singularização por pontos relevantes a serem determinados em cada caso.(Deleuze 1996:5)

Assim como nos livros de Deleuze sobre cinema, a teoria bergsoniana das imagens é central para a argumentação. O processo de cristalização também aparecerá no conceito deleuziano de imagem-tempo. Quanto à oposição “pontos ordinários”X”pontos relevantes”, pode ser relacionada à Etologia que ele encontrou em Von Uexküll e relacionou à Ética de Espinosa.

Programa de Pós-Graduação em Antropologia Social da Universidade Federal de São Carlos (PPGAS/UFSCar).
Departamento de Ciências Sociais da Universidade Federal de São Carlos (DCSo/UFSCar).


ANTUNES, Arnaldo. 2006. Como é que chama o nome disso: Antologia. São Paulo: Publifolha.

DELEUZE, Gilles. 1996. O atual e o virtual. In: Éric Alliez. Deleuze Filosofia Virtual. (trad. Heloísa B.S. Rocha) São Paulo: Ed.34, pp.47-57.

KUGLER, Peter N.; TURVEY, Michael T. 1987. Information, natural law, and the self-assembly of rhythmic movement. Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

MAUSS, Marcel. 2003. Sociologia e Antropologia. (trad. Paulo Neves) São Paulo: Cosac & Naify. [1950] [Versão eletrônica em francês]

SCHRÖDINGER, Erwin. 1993. What is life? The physical aspect of the living cell, with Mind and matter & Autobiographical sketches. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [1944]

VARGAS, Eduardo V. 2006. Uso de drogas: a alter-ação como evento. Revista de Antropologia 49(2):581-623.

WHITEHEAD, Alfred N. 1971. The concept of Nature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [1919]


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